TRUST Seminar Series
The Fall 2010 TRUST Seminar Series talks will be held in Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge on the campus of the
University of California, Berkeley Thursdays from 1:00 - 2:00 PM.
If you are visiting Cory Hall from off campus, please see
the Visitor Information page.
To receive notification of future TRUST Seminar Series talks, please join either the
trustlocal or
the trustseminar workgroup.
(Most members of TRUST that are located to UC Berkeley
should join the trustlocal workgroup
instead of the trustseminar workgroup.)
Information on past TRUST Seminars is available here.
Spring 2010 TRUST Seminar Series
Ripley: Automatically Securing Web 2.0 Applications Through Replicated Execution
Ben Livshits, Microsoft Research
Thursday, January 14, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. Rich Internet applications are becoming increasingly distributed, as demonstrated by the popularity of AJAX or Web 2.0 applications such
as Facebook, Google Maps, Hotmail and many others. A typical multi-tier AJAX application consists, at the least, of a server-side component implemented in
Java J2EE, PHP or ASP.NET and a client-side component running JavaScript. The resulting application is more responsive because computation has moved
closer to the client, avoiding unnecessary network round trips for frequent user actions.
However, once a portion of the code has moved to the client, a malicious user can subvert the client side of the computation, jeopardizing the integrity
of the server-side state. In this project we propose Ripley, a system that uses replicated execution to automatically preserve the integrity of a distributed
computation. Ripley replicates a copy of the client-side computation on the trusted server tier. Every client-side event is transferred to the replica of
the client for execution. Ripley observes results of the computation, both as computed on the client-side and on the server side using the replica of the
client-side code. Any discrepancy is flagged as a potential violation of computational integrity.
We built Ripley on top of Volta, a distributing compiler that translates .NET applications into JavaScript, effectively providing a measure of security
by construction for Volta applications. We have evaluated the Ripley approach on five representative AJAX applications built in Volta and also on Hotmail,
a large widely-used AJAX application. Our results so far suggest that Ripley provides a promising strategy for building secure distributed web applications, which places minimal burden on the application developer at the cost of a low performance overhead.
.
Ben Livshits is a researcher at Microsoft Research in Redmond, WA. He received a B.A. from Cornell University in 1999, and his M.S. and Ph.D. from
Stanford University in 2002 and 2006, respectively. Dr. Livshits' research interests include application of sophisticated static and dynamic analysis
techniques to finding errors in programs.
He is known for his work on software reliability and especially tools to improve software security, with a primary focus on approaches to finding buffer
overruns in C programs and a variety of security vulnerabilities (cross-site scripting, SQL injections, etc.) in Web-based applications. Lately he has
been focused on how Web 2.0 application reliability, performance, and security can be improved through a combination of static and runtime techniques.
Virtualization-Aware Security in Cloud Environments
Mihai Christodorescu, IBM
Thursday, January 21, 2010 at 1:00PM
540a/b, Cory Hall <-- Note different location
Abstract. The cloud approach to computing, where users outsource part of their workload to a cloud provider's data center, holds the promise of
efficient and reliable large-scale computation. At the same time, because it multiplies the actors involved, cloud computing introduces significant
security challenges. Ideally, a mechanism that offers complete isolation between the many cloud workloads and the cloud infrastructure itself is needed.
Virtualization is an approximation of such an isolation mechanism, where a hypervisor (part of the cloud infrastructure) manages the execution of virtual
machines (the users' workloads). Coupled with the fact that the hypervisor can observe the execution of virtual machines (VMs) via VM introspection,
virtualization enables the creation of a variety of security tools to detect or even prevent attacks against VM workloads.
In this setting, I will discuss several ongoing projects in our security group at IBM Research. I will argue that the security guarantees of
VM-introspection tools are weakened when moving from standalone virtualization to virtualization in the cloud. Our solution for secure VM introspection
in the cloud relies only on the integrity of the virtual hardware (and implicitly the hypervisor). Additionally I will discuss security applications built
on this secure-introspection primitive, allowing the cloud provider to monitor the runtime integrity of user workloads..
.
Mihai Christodorescu researches software and system security at the IBM T.J. Watson Research Center. His current interests include behavior-based
analysis and malware detection, web privacy, and cloud integrity. He received a Ph.D. in 2007 from University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he was advised
by Somesh Jha. Before that, he earned a B.S. degree in Computer Science from University of California at Santa Barbara.
Competitive Cyber-Insurers in the Network with Interdependent Security
Galina Schwartz, University of California at Berkeley
Thursday, January 28, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. The paper investigates the effects of competitive cyber-insurers on
network security when
users are arbitrary risk-averse and network security is costly for them.
In our model, a user's probability to incur damage (from being
attacked) depends on both his
security and the network security, and improving security becomes more
costly for a user when his security is higher.
First, we consider cyber-insurers who
cannot observe (and thus, affect) individual user security. This asymmetric
information causes moral hazard (i.e., once a user is insured, his
incentives to invest in security worsen). Then, if an equilibrium
exists, network security always worsens relative to the no-insurance
equilibrium. Though with cyber-insurers user welfare may increase (due
to risk redistribution), aggregate costs of network insecurity
increase as well due to higher network risks.
Next, we introduce two user types (good and bad), which insurers
cannot distinguish.
This additional informational asymmetry causes adverse selection
(i.e., bad users purchase insurance contracts designed for good
users).
We demonstrate that our model permits to price competitive
cyber-insurance in the presence of multiple user types. In the pooling
equilibrium with insurance, good users subsidize bad users, and
network security worsens relative to the no-insurance equilibrium.
Lastly, we consider insurers with full information about their users'
security. Here, user security is perfectly enforceable (zero cost). Each
insurance contract stipulates the required user security and covers the entire
user damage. Still, for a significant range of parameters, network
security worsens
relative to the no-insurance equilibrium. Thus, in general,
competitive cyber-insurers may fail to improve network security.
.
Galina Schwartz is a researcher in the Department of Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science, at the University of California,
Berkeley. Her focus is game theory applications to Internet commerce,
specifically Internet security and service quality (network
neutrality). Galina Schwartz received her Ph.D. in Economics from
Princeton University. Prior to joining TRUST, she taught economics in
the Department of Economics, UC-Berkeley and UC-Davis, and finance in
the Department of Finance at the University of Michigan, Ann-Arbor,
Ross School of Business. She collaborates with University of Michigan
Center for Information Technology Integration (CITI).
A Framework for Computing the Privacy Scores of Users in Online Social Networks
Kun Liu, Yahoo!
Thursday, February 4th, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. Social-networking sites have grown tremendously in popularity in recent years. Services such as Facebook and MySpace allow millions of
users to create online profiles and to share details of their personal lives with vast networks of friends, and often, strangers. Inevitably,
the disclosure of personal information has implications on users' privacy: digital stalking and identity theft are some of the most common threats.
Unfortunately, even sophisticated users who value their privacy will often compromise it to improve their presence in the virtual world. They know that
loss of control over their personal information poses a long-term threat, but they cannot assess the overall and long-term risk accurately enough to
compare it to the short-term gain. Even worse, setting the privacy preferences in online services is often a complicated and time consuming task that
users usually skip. To address these issues, we are developing mechanisms and platforms to measure and monitor users' privacy risks and help them easily
manage their information sharing. In this talk, I am going to introduce our work in this area. I am hoping that the talk could inspire discussions and
new ideas that will eventually make our online environment safer and more comfortable.
.
Kun Liu, Ph.D. is a Scientist at Yahoo! Labs working on problems related to computational advertising. Before joining Yahoo, Kun was a Postdoctoral
Researcher at IBM Almaden Research Center, working on privacy-preserving social-network analysis, text analytics and healthcare informatics. His
contributions to these projects have won him five IBM Invention Achievement Awards, one IBM Invention Plateau Award and one IBM Bravo Award. Kun received
his Ph.D. in Computer Science from University of Maryland Baltimore County in 2007. His research interests include privacy-preserving data mining,
social-network analysis, text analytics, distributed data mining and statistical machine learning.
NO TRUST SEMINAR DUE TO BEARS
Thursday, February 11, 2010
Abnormal Events Management in Complex Process Plants: Challenges, Opportunities, and Emerging Trends
Venkat Venkatasubramanian, Purdue University
Thursday, February 18, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. Abnormal situations arise in process plants when plants deviate from normal operational modes. Such excursions could have an adverse
effect on product quality, process safety, occupational health, environmental quality and process economics. The economic impact of such abnormal
situations is enormous; about $30 billion/year in losses in the petrochemical industries alone in the US. The cost is much more when includes other
industries such as pharmaceutical, specialty chemicals, and power industries. Furthermore, process safety, security, occupational health, and
environmental hazards are ever increasing in importance in response to heightening public concern and the resultant tightening of regulations.
Thus, there exists considerable incentive in developing appropriate solutions towards the management of abnormal situations in complex process plants.
People in the process industries view this as the next major challenge in control systems research and application.
There are two different, but related, components of the overall abnormal events management (AEM) problem. One deals with the problem of process safety
during real-time operations. The other deals with safety issues during the design and/or modifications of the plant or the processes. This is, of course,
the domain of process hazards analysis (PHA). In both cases, one depends on humans to perform sophisticated cause-and-effect reasoning through hundreds
of possibilities, and for real-time situations, often under enormous psychological strain. Accidents investigations have shown human errors, due to
information overload, time pressure, and lack of adequate training, are often the major causes of accidents. As a result, researchers have been
investigating the potential of intelligent systems for abnormal situation management and process hazards analysis. These two problem areas are now
poised to play a dominant role in defining the course of process systems research and application for the coming decade. In this talk, I will present
an overview of these two problem areas, the challenges we face and the encouraging emerging trends. Recent progress has promising implications on the
use of intelligent systems for a variety of applications in the chemical, petrochemical, and pharmaceutical industries for inherently safer design,
operator training, abnormal situation management, and optimal process operations.
.
Venkat Venkatasubramanian is a Professor of Chemical Engineering and a Professor of Industrial and Physical Pharmacy (by courtesy) at Purdue
University. He received his Ph. D. in Chemical Engineering (with a Minor in Theoretical Physics) from Cornell University, M.S. in Physics from Vanderbilt
University, and B. Tech. in Chemical Engineering from the University of Madras, India. Venkat worked as a Research Associate in Artificial Intelligence in
the School of Computer Science at Carnegie-Mellon University and taught at Columbia University before joining Purdue in 1988. Prof. Venkatasubramanian's
research contributions have been in the areas of process fault diagnosis and abnormal events management, risk identification and management in complex
engineered systems, pharmaceutical engineering and informatics, product design via discovery informatics, systems biology, and complex adaptive systems
using knowledge-based systems, neural networks, genetic algorithms, mathematical programming and statistical approaches. His teaching interests include
process design, process control, pharmaceutical engineering, systems biology, artificial intelligence, statistical physics, and applied statistics.
Prof. Venkatasubramanian has published 170 refereed papers, and delivered 125 invited lectures and seminars, including 16 keynote/plenary lectures, at
various international conferences and institutions all over the world. He has authored or co-authored three books and co-edited two. Venkat has chaired
or co-chaired over thirty international meetings, conferences and sessions in the areas of artificial intelligence applications in process engineering.
Thirty doctoral and nine masters students have graduated under Venkat's supervision.
Prof. Venkatasubramanian's contributions have been recognized by several awards and honors. He was the 1990 recipient of the Eminent Overseas Lectureship
Award from the Institution of Engineers in Australia. He received the Norris Shreve Award for Outstanding Teaching in Chemical Engineering in 1993, 2004
and 2006, and the Teaching for Tomorrow Award in 2004, both awarded by Purdue University. He is an Associate Editor of Computers and Chemical Engineering.
In 1996, Industry week magazine selected him as `one of the fifty R&D stars in the United States whose achievements are shaping the future of our
industrial culture and America's technology policy'. His co-authored paper on fault diagnosis was awarded the CAST Directors' Award for the Best Poster
Presentation at the 2000 AIChE Annual meeting. Venkat and his students were awarded the Best Paper Prize for 2002-05 from the Journal of Engineering
Applications of Artificial Intelligence, sponsored by the International Federation of Automatic Control (IFAC), for a paper on abnormal events detection
and process risk management. His co-authored paper on informatics won the 2006 Best Paper Prize from Computers and Chemical Engineering. He is a
co-recipient of the Team Research Excellence Award from the College of Engineering, Purdue University, in 2007, for his contributions to the development
of the discovery informatics framework for molecular products design. In 2007, Venkat was recognized for his outstanding teaching record at Purdue as the
only faculty member in the College of Engineering to be elected to the Teaching Academy. In 2010, AIChE honored Venkat with the Computing in Chemical
Engineering Award for his contributions in process systems engineering.
Spamalytics: An Empirical Analysis of Spam Marketing Conversion
Christian Kreibich, ICSI: International Computer Science Institute
Thursday, February 25, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. In his script for `All The President's Men', author William
Goldman coined the famous adage `follow the money', giving Woodward
and Bernstein crucial advice for their investigation. In the past
years, the growth of the Internet has enabled a financially
motivated underground marketplace that presents a case perhaps less
politically motivated but surely no less thrilling, in which this
classic strategy has remained almost entirely unused.
In this talk I will present a study that sheds light on one component of
this market, namely spam-based advertising. The `conversion rate' of
spam, the probability that an unsolicited email with ultimately elicit
a `sale', underlies the entire spam value proposition. However, our
understanding of this critical behavior is quite limited, and the
literature lacks any quantitative study concerning its true value. I
will describe a methodology for using parasitic infiltration of botnets, large networks of infected computers responsible for the vast majority
of spam observed today - to empirically infer the delivery and
conversion rates of spam campaigns. I will present an analysis of over
400 million instrumented spam emails across two campaigns and quantify
the underlying processes that modulate its profits.
The results provide insights into the entire spam conversion
pipeline and illuminate some of the market pressures on the spammers
and botmasters involved, and thus point out initial avenues
for following the money in this poorly understood economy.
.
Christian Kreibich is a staff research scientist at the
International Computer Science Institute in Berkeley. He received his
Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge, UK, and a Diplom in Computer
Science from the Technical University of Munich, Germany. His research
focuses on topics in network architecture, distributed systems, and
network security.
Secure Information Flow in Trust Networks
Lakshminarayanan Subramanian, New York University
Thursday, March 4, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. Secure Information Flow is a fundamental problem in the security of networks and large-scale distributed
systems where the basic question is: Under what constraints will a piece of information flow securely in
a network in the face of adversaries propagating bogus information? Answering this question has important
ramifications on how we design secure routing protocols, secure DNS, secure content rating systems, Sybil-resilient P2P systems.
In this talk, I will present some of our recent results in addressing the secure information problem in trust
networks where each network edge represents a strong trust relationship between the participating nodes.
In the first result, I will describe a decentralized mechanism to compute the "reputation of routing protocol updates"
in a trust network. In the second result, I will describe a distributed verification protocol that can drastically
reduce the number of admitted Sybil identities in a decentralized trust network. In the third result, I will show how we can
achieve probabilistic secure information flow in sparse trust networks (with high probability guarantees)
by establishing weak trust relationships with "constrained random" friends. At the end, I will describe
how we can use a combination of these three results to improve the security of many existing networks and distributed
systems.
.
Lakshminarayanan Subramanian is an assistant professor in the Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences
at New York University. His research interests are in the areas of networks, distributed systems and technologies
for developing regions. At NYU, he co-leads the Networks and Wide-area Systems (NeWS) research group and leads
the CATER research initiative, a multi-disciplinary group focusing on appropriate technologies for development.
He is a recipient of the NSF CAREER award, IBM Faculty award and C.V. Ramamoorthy award.
TBD
TBD,
Thursday, March 11, 2010 at 1:00PM
540a/b, Cory Hall <-- Note different location
Abstract. TBD.
TBD TBD.
TBD
Bonnie Zhu, EECS, University of California at Berkeley
Thursday, March 18, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. TBD.
.
TDB TBD.
NO TRUST SEMINAR due to Spring Break
Thursday, March 25, 2010
Privacy on Facebook and Other Social Networking Sites - what do users think and understand?
Jennifer King, University of California at Berkeley
Thursday, April 1, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. Privacy on social networking sites [SNS] is a hot topic with much controversy - can one have any expectations of privacy when sharing personal details about one's life online? Do users understand what happens to their personal information on SNSs? Do they use privacy controls, or even know they're there? Do users understand potential risks to their information, including who can access it, and on Facebook specifically, how third party applications can access their profile data?
I decided to investigate these issues by conducting a survey on Facebook.com using the site's third party application platform. At this talk, I will present my initial findings, focusing both on social networking sites generally and aspects of Facebook.com specifically.
.
Jennifer King is a PhD candidate at the School of Information, UCB. Her work focuses primarily on privacy issues on the internet as well with ubiquitous systems and sensor networks.
Secure control against replay attacks
Bruno Sinopoli, Carnegie Mellon University
Thursday, April 8, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. This work analyzes the effect of replay attacks on a control system. We assume an attacker wishes to disrupt the operation of a control system
in steady state. In order to inject an exogenous control input without being detected the attacker will hijack the sensors, observe and record their
readings for a certain amount of time and repeat them while carrying out his attack. This is a very common and natural attack (we have seen numerous
times intruders recording and replaying security videos while performing their attack undisturbed) for an attacker who does not know the dynamics of the
system but is aware of the fact that the system itself is expected to be in steady state for the duration of the attack. We assume the control system to
be a discrete time linear time invariant Gaussian system applying an infinite horizon Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) controller. We also assume that the
system is equipped with a Chi Square failure detector. The main contributions of this work, beyond the novelty of the problem formulation, consist in
1) providing conditions on the feasibility of the replay attack on the aforementioned system and 2) proposing a countermeasure that guarantees a desired
robability of detection (with a fixed false alarm rate) by trading off either detection delay or closed loop system performance.
.
Bruno Sinopoli received the Dr. Eng. degree from the University of Padova in 1998 and his M.S. and Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the
University of California at Berkeley, in 2003 and 2005 respectively, along with the Management of Technology Certificate from the Haas Business School.
After a postdoctoral position at Stanford University, Dr. Sinopoli joined the faculty at Carnegie Mellon University where he is an assistant professor in
the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering with courtesy appointments in Mechanical Engineering and in the Robotics Institute.
Dr. Sinopoli was awarded the 2006 Eli Jury Award for outstanding research achievement in the areas of systems, communications, control and signal
processing at U.C. Berkeley.
His research interests include networked embedded control systems, distributed estimation and control with applications to wireless sensor-actuator
networks and system security.
Digital Identity Management and Protection
Elisa Bertino, CS Department, CERIAS, Purdue University
Thursday, April 15, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. Digital identity management (DIM) has emerged as a critical foundation for supporting successful interaction in today's globally
interconnected society. It is crucial not only for the conduct of business and government but also for a large and growing body of electronic or online
social interactions. Digital identity management is usually coupled with the notion of federation. The goal of federations is to provide users with
protected environments to federate identities by the proper management of identity attributes. Federations provide a controlled method by which federation
members can provide more integrated and complete services to a qualified group of individuals within certain sets of business transactions. By controlling
the scope of access to participating sites, and by enabling secure, cross-domain transmission of user's personal information, federations can make the
perpetration of identity frauds more difficult, as well as reduce their frequency, and their potential impact. In this talk we will first discuss basic
digital identity concepts and requirements towards DIM solutions and we will overview relevant initiatives currently undergoing in academia and industry.
We will then focus on the problem of identity theft and discuss an initial solution to the problem of establishing and protecting digital identity.
.
Elisa Bertino is professor of Computer Science at Purdue University and serves as Research Director of the Center for Education and Research in
Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS). Previously she was a faculty member at Department of Computer Science and Communication of the University of
Milan where she directed the DB&SEC laboratory. She has been a visiting researcher at the IBM Research Laboratory (now Almaden) in San Jose, at the
Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation, at Rutgers University, at Telcordia Technologies.
Her main research interests include security, privacy, digital identity management systems, database systems, distributed systems, multimedia systems.
In those areas, Prof. Bertino has published more than 250 papers in all major refereed journals, and in proceedings of international conferences and
symposia. She is a co-author of the books "Object-Oriented Database Systems - Concepts and Architectures" 1993 (Addison-Wesley International Publ.),
"Indexing Techniques for Advanced Database Systems" 1997 (Kluwer Academic Publishers), "Intelligent Database Systems" 2001 (Addison-Wesley International
Publ.), and "Security for Web Services and Service Oriented Architectures" 2010 Springer. She has been a co-editor in chief of the Very Large Database
Systems (VLDB) Journal from 2001 to 2007. She serves (has served) on the editorial boards of several scientific journals, including IEEE Internet
Computing, IEEE Security&Privacy, ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, ACM Transactions on Web.
Elisa Bertino is a Fellow member of IEEE and a Fellow member of ACM. She received the 2002 IEEE Computer Society Technical Achievement Award
for "For outstanding contributions to database systems and database security and advanced data management systems" and the 2005 IEEE Computer
Society Tsutomu Kanai Award "For pioneering and innovative research contributions to secure distributed systems".
TBD
TBD,
Thursday, April 22, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. TBD.
.
TDB TBD.
TBD
TBD,
Thursday, April 29, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract. TBD.
.
TDB TBD.
SafeFox: A Safe Lightweight Virtual Browsing Environment
Anup Gosh, Center for Secure Information Systems (CSIS) at George Mason University
Thursday, May 6, 2010 at 1:00PM
Soda Hall, Wozniak Lounge
Abstract.
The browser has become a popular attack vector for implanting code on computer operating systems. Equally critical, important sessions, such as online
banking and other sensitive online activities, must be protected from cross-site attacks from other concurrent sessions. In this presentation, we describe
an approach using lightweight virtualization to create a safe browsing environment, called SafeFox,to protect both the host and important browsing
sessions from malicious Web content. With SafeFox,the browser runs in its own virtual environment (VE) in its own process namespace, file system, and IP
address; furthermore, when browsing to a secure bookmarked site SafeFox automatically creates a new isolated lightweight virtual environment (VE) for the
secure bookmarked site. While the native platform of SafeFox is Linux, we have created a SafeFox virtual appliance to run on multiple platforms, including
Windows. An implementation is currently being commercialized.
.
Anup Gosh is Research Professor and Chief Scientist in the Center for Secure Information Systems (CSIS) at George Mason University. Dr. Ghosh was previously Senior Scientist and Program
Manager in the Advanced Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) where he managed an extensive portfolio of information assurance and information operations
programs. Ghosh is also founder of Secure Command, a software security company that commercializes next generation security research. Ghosh's research focuses combating malicious software within the
enterprise. He has developed novel approaches for securing desktops using virtualization. He is also developing techniques for detecting malicious code within enterprise networks by classifying network traffic flows.
Ghosh previously served in executive management as Vice President of Research at Cigital, Inc. He has served as principal investigator on contracts from DARPA, NSA, and NIST's Advanced Technology
Program and has written more than 40 peer-reviewed conference and journal articles. Ghosh is also author of three books on computer network defense. Ghosh serves on the editorial board of
IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine and has been guest editor for IEEE Software and IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications. Ghosh is currently a member of the Committee on
Information Assurance for Network-Centric Naval Forces for the Naval Studies Board, National Research Council. Ghosh is a Senior Member of the IEEE. For his contributions to DoD's information
assurance, Dr. Ghosh was awarded the Frank B. Rowlett Trophy for Individual Contributions by the National Security Agency in November 2005, a Federal government wide award. He was also awarded
the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service for his contributions while at DARPA. In 2005, Worcester Polytechnic Institute awarded Dr. Ghosh its Hobart Newell Award
for Outstanding Contributions to the Electrical and Computer Engineering Profession. Ghosh has previously been awarded the IEEE's Millenium Medal for Outstanding Contributions to E-Commerce
Security. Ghosh completed is Ph.D. and Master of Science in Electrical Engineering from the University of Virginia and his Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from Worcester Polytechnic
Institute.
Details about how the seminar is managed can be found at
How is the TRUST Seminar managed?
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