SIF: Enforcing Confidentiality and Integrity in Web Applications
S. Chong, K. Vikram, A. C. Myers

Citation
S. Chong, K. Vikram, A. C. Myers. "SIF: Enforcing Confidentiality and Integrity in Web Applications". Proceedings of the 16th USENIX Security Symposium, 1-16, August, 2007.

Abstract
SIF (Servlet Information Flow) is a novel software framework for building high-assurance web applications, using language-based information-flow control to enforce security. Explicit, end-to-end confidentiality and integrity policies can be given either as compile-time program annotations, or as run-time user requirements. Compile-time and run-time checking efficiently enforce these policies. Information flow analysis is known to be useful against SQL injection and cross-site scripting, but SIF prevents inappropriate use of information more generally: the flow of confidential information to clients is controlled, as is the flow of low-integrity information from clients. Expressive policies allow users and application providers to protect information from one another. SIF moves trust out of the web application, and into the framework and compiler. This provides application deployers with stronger security assurance. Language-based information flow promises cheap, strong information security. But until now, it could not effectively enforce information security in highly dynamic applications. To build SIF, we developed new language features that make it possible to write realistic web applications. Increased assurance is obtained with modest enforcement overhead.

Electronic downloads

• http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/papers/sif.pdf

Citation formats

• HTML

  S. Chong, K. Vikram, A. C. Myers. <a
  href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/451.html"
  >SIF: Enforcing Confidentiality and Integrity in Web
  Applications</a>, Proceedings of the 16th USENIX
  Security Symposium, 1-16, August, 2007.

• Plain text

  S. Chong, K. Vikram, A. C. Myers. "SIF: Enforcing
  Confidentiality and Integrity in Web Applications".
  Proceedings of the 16th USENIX Security Symposium, 1-16,
  August, 2007.

• BibTeX

  @inproceedings{ChongVikramMyers07_SIFEnforcingConfidentialityIntegrityInWebApplications,
      author = {S. Chong and K. Vikram and A. C. Myers},
      title = {SIF: Enforcing Confidentiality and Integrity in
                Web Applications},
      booktitle = {Proceedings of the 16th USENIX Security Symposium},
      pages = {1-16},
      month = {August},
      year = {2007},
      abstract = {SIF (Servlet Information Flow) is a novel software
                framework for building high-assurance web
                applications, using language-based
                information-flow control to enforce security.
                Explicit, end-to-end confidentiality and integrity
                policies can be given either as compile-time
                program annotations, or as run-time user
                requirements. Compile-time and run-time checking
                efficiently enforce these policies. Information
                flow analysis is known to be useful against SQL
                injection and cross-site scripting, but SIF
                prevents inappropriate use of information more
                generally: the flow of confidential information to
                clients is controlled, as is the flow of
                low-integrity information from clients. Expressive
                policies allow users and application providers to
                protect information from one another. SIF moves
                trust out of the web application, and into the
                framework and compiler. This provides application
                deployers with stronger security assurance.
                Language-based information flow promises cheap,
                strong information security. But until now, it
                could not effectively enforce information security
                in highly dynamic applications. To build SIF, we
                developed new language features that make it
                possible to write realistic web applications.
                Increased assurance is obtained with modest
                enforcement overhead. },
      URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/451.html}
  }
  

Posted by Andrew C. Myers, Ph.D. on 22 Aug 2008.
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