buttonTrust
 
Commands
  Search pubs database

Quick search by ...
 
 
Year
  2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2002

Group
  aftrust
aftrustfaculty
deab
eab
eduboard
education
euus
healthcare
hsn
idtheft
knowledgetransfer
languages
netdefenses
patientmonitor
policy
scada
sensornets
sensorprivacy
trust
trustfaculty
trustlocal
trustseminar
trustworthy
university
wise2006

Why Phishing Works
Rachna Dhamija, Doug Tygar, Marti Hearst

Citation
Rachna Dhamija, Doug Tygar, Marti Hearst. "Why Phishing Works". CHI '06: Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human Factors in computing systems, ACM Special Interest Group on Computer-Human Interaction, 581-590, January, 2006;

Note: Slashdot mentions a Security Focus Interview about this paper. .

Abstract
To build systems shielding users from fraudulent (or phishing) websites, designers need to know which attack strategies work and why. This paper provides the first empirical evidence about which malicious strategies are successful at deceiving general users. We first analyzed a large set of captured phishing attacks and developed a set of hypotheses about why these strategies might work. We then assessed these hypotheses with a usability study in which 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and asked to determine which ones were fraudulent. We found that 23% of the participants did not look at browser-based cues such as the address bar, status bar and the security indicators, leading to incorrect choices 40% of the time. We also found that some visual deception attacks can fool even the most sophisticated users. These results illustrate that standard security indicators are not effective for a substantial fraction of users, and suggest that alternative approaches are needed.

Electronic downloads

Citation formats  

  • HTML
    Rachna Dhamija, Doug Tygar, Marti Hearst. <a
    href="http://www.truststc.org/pubs/104.html">Why
    Phishing Works</a>, CHI '06: Proceedings of the SIGCHI
    conference on Human Factors in computing systems, ACM
    Special Interest Group on Computer-Human Interaction,
    581-590, January, 2006; <p>Note: <a
    href="http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=06/06/28/1430257">Slashdot</a>
    
    mentions a
    <a
    href="http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/407">Security
    Focus Interview</a> about this paper.
    .
  • Plain text
    Rachna Dhamija, Doug Tygar, Marti Hearst. "Why Phishing
    Works". CHI '06: Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on
    Human Factors in computing systems, ACM Special Interest
    Group on Computer-Human Interaction, 581-590, January, 2006;
    

    Note: Slashdot mentions a Security Focus Interview about this paper. .

  • BibTeX
    @inproceedings{DhamijaTygarHearst06_WhyPhishingWorks,
        author = {Rachna Dhamija, Doug Tygar, Marti Hearst},
        title = {Why Phishing Works},
        booktitle = {CHI '06: Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on
                  Human Factors in computing systems},
        organization = {ACM Special Interest Group on Computer-Human
                  Interaction},
        pages = {581-590},
        month = {January},
        year = {2006},
        note = {

    Note: Slashdot mentions a Security Focus Interview about this paper. }, abstract = {To build systems shielding users from fraudulent (or phishing) websites, designers need to know which attack strategies work and why. This paper provides the first empirical evidence about which malicious strategies are successful at deceiving general users. We first analyzed a large set of captured phishing attacks and developed a set of hypotheses about why these strategies might work. We then assessed these hypotheses with a usability study in which 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and asked to determine which ones were fraudulent. We found that 23% of the participants did not look at browser-based cues such as the address bar, status bar and the security indicators, leading to incorrect choices 40% of the time. We also found that some visual deception attacks can fool even the most sophisticated users. These results illustrate that standard security indicators are not effective for a substantial fraction of users, and suggest that alternative approaches are needed. }, URL = {http://www.truststc.org/pubs/104.html} }

Posted by Christopher Brooks on 28 Jun 2006.
For additional information, see the Publications FAQ or contact webmaster at www truststc org..

Notice: This material is presented to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly and technical work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright holders. All persons copying this information are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by each author's copyright.

You are not logged in 
© 2005-2010 Trust